PENGARUH PEMEGANG SAHAM PENGENDALI TERHADAP KOMPENSASI DIREKSI DENGAN MEKANISME PEMEGANG SAHAM INSTITUSIONAL SEBAGAI VARIABEL PEMODERASI



Andre Bustari

Abstract


Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk membuktikan pemegang saham pengendali terhadap kompensasi direksi dengan mekanisme pemegang saham institusional sebagai variabel pemoderasi. Sampel penelitian ini adalah 22 perusahaan yang menjadi emiten tetap terbesar termasuk kedalam Likuiditas 45 (LQ45) dari periode 2011 sampai dengan 2015. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah metode kuantitatif. Uji statistik yang gunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah Regresi Linear Berganda. Teori keagenan memperediksi bahwa pemegang saham pengendali berpengaruh positif terhadap kompensasi direksi. Hasil penelitian pertama tidak dapat membuktikan pengaruh pemegang saham pengendali terhadap kompensasi direksi dikarenakan fungsi pemegang saham pengendali dilaksanakan oleh Komite Independen sesuai yang diisyaratkan oleh peraturan-peraturan yang diterbitkan oleh Otorita Jasa Keuangan sehingga pemegang saham pengendali tidak mempengaruhi pemberian kompensasi kepada direksi. Hasil penelitian kedua tidak membuktikan pengaruh pemegang saham institusional dalam memperlemah pengaruh pemegang saham pengendali terhadap kompensasi direksi. Ini diduga pemegang saham institusional menilai pemberian kompensasi dan pengawasnya sudah dilaksanakan dengan adanya komite independen internal perusahaan.

 

This study aims to prove the controlling shareholder to the compensation of the directors with the mechanism of institutional shareholders as a moderating variable. The sample of this research is 22 companies which become the biggest listed company including into Liquidity 45 (LQ45) from period 2011 to 2015. The research method used is quantitative method. The statistical test used in this study is Multiple Linear Regression. The agency theory predicts that the controlling shareholders positively influence the compensation of the board of directors. The results of the first study cannot prove the influence of the controlling shareholder on the compensation of the directors because the controlling shareholder function is carried out by the Independent Committee in accordance with the rules issued by the Financial Services Authority so that the controlling shareholder does not affect the compensation to the directors. The results of the second study do not prove the influence of institutional shareholders in weakening the influence of the controlling shareholder on the compensation of the directors. It is alleged that the institutional shareholders assess the compensation and the supervisor has been implemented with the company's internal independent committee.


Keywords


controlling shareholder; directors' compensation; and institutional shareholders

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